So, what the heck is state repression?
(from my “State Repression and Political Order” - The Annual Review of Political Science 2007.)
By most accounts, repression involves the actual or threatened use of physical sanctions against an individual or organization, within the territorial jurisdiction of the state, for the purpose of imposing a cost on the target as well as deterring specific activities and/or beliefs perceived to be challenging to government personnel, practices or institutions (Robert J. Goldstein 1978, p. xxvii). Like other forms of coercion, repressive behavior relies on threats and intimidation to compel targets, but it does not concern itself with all coercive applications (e.g., deterrence of violent crime and theft). Rather, it deals with applications of state power that violate First Amendment–type rights, due process in the enforcement and adjudication of law, and personal integrity or security.
First Amendment–type rights include (Goldstein 1978, pp. xxx–xxxi):
Freedom of speech, assembly and movement. Freedom of the press up to a very narrowly defined “clear and present danger” point,
regardless of the views communicated.
Freedom of association and religion without governmental reprisal, obloquy, or investigation unless clearly connected with possible violations of
existing laws. The general freedom to boycott, peacefully picket, or strike without suffering criminal or civil penalties.
Due process transgressions involve violations of “generally accepted standards of police action and judicial and administrative behavior related to the political beliefs of the person involved” (Goldstein 1978, p. xxxi).
Personal integrity rights are those concerned with individual survival and security, such as freedom from torture, “disappearance,” imprisonment, extrajudicial execution, and mass killing.
The definition of repression employed here is important not only for what it includes but also for what it excludes. For example, the definition does not consider the deleterious after-effects of particular structural characteristics experienced over long periods of time, such as the inequitable distribution of resources (Johan Galtung’s “structural violence”).
The definition does not consider what are referred to as second-generation (economic, social, and cultural privileges) and third-generation rights (the right to peace and a clean environment).
The definition does not specify that a behavioral threat must exist, as in the case of “protest policing” (e.g., Jennifer Earl 2003), nor does it specify that a law must be violated, like with regard to “human rights violations” (e.g., Steve Poe & C. Neal Tate 1994).
The definition does not specify the particular ends to which repressive action is put, nor how successfully authorities achieve the following objectives—topics that should be subjects of investigation in themselves:
(a) setting general limits within which citizens can act;
(b) controlling or eliminating specific challenges (real or imagined) to existing political leaders, institutions, and/or practices; and
(c) facilitating movement in a particular direction—e.g., a preferred strategy of development or ideological orientation.
My conception encompasses a wide variety of coercive efforts employed by political authorities to influence those within their territorial jurisdiction: overt and covert; selective, collective and indiscriminate targeting; violent and nonviolent; state, state-sponsored (e.g., militias), and state-affiliated (e.g., death squads); successful and unsuccessful. Many researchers do not adopt such an approach, but I believe that this is a critical error for two reasons:
(a) These more focused efforts ignore the fact that governments select from the full repertoire of coercive activities highlighted above, and
(b) these more focused efforts miss the underlying similarities that exist across the diverse forms of repressive behavior.
By most accounts, repression involves the actual or threatened use of physical sanctions against an individual or organization, within the territorial jurisdiction of the state, for the purpose of imposing a cost on the target as well as deterring specific activities and/or beliefs perceived to be challenging to government personnel, practices or institutions (Robert J. Goldstein 1978, p. xxvii). Like other forms of coercion, repressive behavior relies on threats and intimidation to compel targets, but it does not concern itself with all coercive applications (e.g., deterrence of violent crime and theft). Rather, it deals with applications of state power that violate First Amendment–type rights, due process in the enforcement and adjudication of law, and personal integrity or security.
First Amendment–type rights include (Goldstein 1978, pp. xxx–xxxi):
Freedom of speech, assembly and movement. Freedom of the press up to a very narrowly defined “clear and present danger” point,
regardless of the views communicated.
Freedom of association and religion without governmental reprisal, obloquy, or investigation unless clearly connected with possible violations of
existing laws. The general freedom to boycott, peacefully picket, or strike without suffering criminal or civil penalties.
Due process transgressions involve violations of “generally accepted standards of police action and judicial and administrative behavior related to the political beliefs of the person involved” (Goldstein 1978, p. xxxi).
Personal integrity rights are those concerned with individual survival and security, such as freedom from torture, “disappearance,” imprisonment, extrajudicial execution, and mass killing.
The definition of repression employed here is important not only for what it includes but also for what it excludes. For example, the definition does not consider the deleterious after-effects of particular structural characteristics experienced over long periods of time, such as the inequitable distribution of resources (Johan Galtung’s “structural violence”).
The definition does not consider what are referred to as second-generation (economic, social, and cultural privileges) and third-generation rights (the right to peace and a clean environment).
The definition does not specify that a behavioral threat must exist, as in the case of “protest policing” (e.g., Jennifer Earl 2003), nor does it specify that a law must be violated, like with regard to “human rights violations” (e.g., Steve Poe & C. Neal Tate 1994).
The definition does not specify the particular ends to which repressive action is put, nor how successfully authorities achieve the following objectives—topics that should be subjects of investigation in themselves:
(a) setting general limits within which citizens can act;
(b) controlling or eliminating specific challenges (real or imagined) to existing political leaders, institutions, and/or practices; and
(c) facilitating movement in a particular direction—e.g., a preferred strategy of development or ideological orientation.
My conception encompasses a wide variety of coercive efforts employed by political authorities to influence those within their territorial jurisdiction: overt and covert; selective, collective and indiscriminate targeting; violent and nonviolent; state, state-sponsored (e.g., militias), and state-affiliated (e.g., death squads); successful and unsuccessful. Many researchers do not adopt such an approach, but I believe that this is a critical error for two reasons:
(a) These more focused efforts ignore the fact that governments select from the full repertoire of coercive activities highlighted above, and
(b) these more focused efforts miss the underlying similarities that exist across the diverse forms of repressive behavior.
