The Year..:  2014 is the year of ENDKILL.  A 365 day journey into my research archive and active agenda, reflecting on what we know and do not know about mass atrocities and how to stop them (delivered once weekly so as not to burden the viewer/reader/audience).  (Sent via proxy while traveling)

With renewed discussion of Human Security Report and Jay Ulfelder's reflection about the possibility of declining violence, I wished to step back or to the side for a second.  At present, much of the discussion about trends in violence is problematic.  

First, much of the discussion seems to be based on war - both the interstate and civil varieties. These are of course historically important but they are not the only games in town. Indeed, by some accounts, these have been side shows to the arguably more lethal state sponsored mass killings like the destruction of native americans in the us, jews and others during the holocaust or mass purges of the Stalinist and Maoist regimes. Steven Pinker also talks about homicide but essentially he seems to be talking about what takes place in Europe.  What of the rest of the world?  Detroit and the Democratic Republic of Congo are not trending downward anytime soon.

Second, the current discussion seems to conflate perpetrators in an unsettling way. Homicide is undertaken by ordinary citizens; terrorism, insurgency and revolution by behavioral challengers; and genocide and most human rights violations by governments. These all take the same types of cues and respond to means, motive as well as opportunity in the same ways?  Ummmmmmmm.  

Third, there seems to be little discussion about the substantive meaning of the trend. A lower or declining number is believed to be better but I would like to reflect on this for a few minutes.  

If political authorities no longer kill those under their jurisdiction because they have subdued, beaten, "pacified" the relevant populations (e.g., removed challenging ideas to those in power and those associated with them), does this mean that things have actually gotten better? I can see the logic of saying yes as there are fewer dead bodies but I can also see this as limiting as it does not prompt us to assess the quality of life for the bodies that are left walking around. 

Before I am accused of saying that some people are better off dead, let me clarify.  Within the trendology discussion there appears to be little discussion regarding what the live bodies do/think/feel that are left on the earth.  If we were found to live in a world where we were less likely to be killed but we were all only thinking one idea (insert random idea here), is this a world that we would like to be in?  I think the question merits consideration. 

Accordingly, I would like to see and will participate in a more detailed conversation about the causal mechanisms driving the trends under discussion.  We may be in a "long peace" but if "peace" is only conceived of as non-violence, then I would suggest that that peace is an empty one.  I do not wish to only live in a world that is only less violent (a conclusion that I am not willing to completely accept yet). I also wish to live in a world that is more diverse in terms of ideas regarding how we should/could/ought to live. I wish to live in a world where the different people of the world are respected for the beliefs that they have held throughout time not the ones they are wiling to adopt as they move forward.  I wish to live in a world that is more equitable, which is something that rarely enters into these discussions about trends. Finally, I wish to feel more not less connected to those around me (insert crack about social media and video games here).  In short, I wish to have a deeper conception of life beyond violence/non-violence.  All I am saying is "give peace a chance".

The Year..:  2014 is the year of ENDKILL.  A 365 day journey into my research archive and active agenda, reflecting on what we know and do not know about mass atrocities and how to stop them (delivered once weekly so as not to burden the viewer/reader/audience).


Years ago (when I was working on some unpublished research with David Armstrong and Mark Lichbach) I had this idea that our understanding of civil war (marked by the dashed lines above) had limited our conception of contentious politics.  The concept seemed to suck all of the air out of the subject - getting us to think about only one form of violence, forgetting the forest for the trees as it were.  We then brought together all forms of contentious politics that we could get our hands on and began to then work through all civil wars to see what each of the cases looked like.  Nicaragua is below.

As I reflect on the circumstances under which mass atrocities are ended, I am guided to think that the subject should not be separated from the broader phenomenon of political violence, writ large.  If diverse forms of conflict (studied individually) actually "move" together (i.e., are driven by similar forces), then we are missing something by isolating them from one another.  Note how in the Nicaraguan case the different "forms" of political violence first rise (in 1978) and then fall (1979+) together.  Also note how the dip in repression precedes the whole escalatory pattern?  We would generally miss this if we followed the existing practice in the literature where strikes, guerrilla war, riots, revolution, civil war, civil liberties restriction and personal integrity violations would be separated from one another.  

Current political science associations do not help.  The Conflict Processes section of APSA and their associated journal has largely been concerned with first interstate war and then civil war. The human rights violation people kind of have their own section and journal but the area has had a mixed reception for those who use data (no book awards yet for those adopting this methodology) and thus they are not always good at getting their work placed there. Quantitatively oriented human rights scholars thus try Conflict Processes or Peace Science.  I always wondered where the people go in political science that are interested in protest or, worse yet, protest policing.  This has not been something Conflict Processes has focused on nor Peace Science - although this has been changing as of late.  If the protest/policing was connected with democratization, then folks could find a home.  Or, if it involved some methodological innovation, then the individual could go to Political Methodology, but in doing so they kind of lose their broader audience who would not look there and might not have the time to search all relevant key words.  God forbid the researcher use an American case because that would lead the Comparativists and International Relations/World scholars in the opposite direction. And, don't even think about doing an African American case and try to convince someone that it is relevant for other places, other times.  I remember presenting something about US protest/protest policing at ISA one year and having someone ask me why I presented my peace at the meeting.  I simply responded: "American contention does not have relevance for the rest of the world?  We arm, train and act about as much as anyone when it comes to contentious political behavior, so why would I not do this?"  

As students and scholars go about their business of researching, writing and reading, we might guide folks away from the artificially created, reified and institutionally sustained areas of civil war, genocide, terrorism, human rights violation and political dissent and move them towards the broader phenomenon of political violence and a version of contentious politics where state behavior is more fully integrated.  If we are to keep the areas siloed, we might at least try to consult the Annual Review of Political Science to get some sense of what innovations, insights in the respective areas might hold for the particular form of political violence we are interested in.  The key to ending mass atrocities might just be found in some piece regarding ending gang violence or police harassment.  

The Year..:  2014 is the year of ENDKILL.  A 365 day journey into my research archive and active agenda, reflecting on what we know and do not know about mass atrocities and how to stop them (delivered once weekly so as not to burden the viewer/reader/audience).  


The original ideas about repression were largely structural-functionalist in orientation whereby some political-economic-culture system resulted in state-sponsored political violence.  Over time, something more akin to the model to the left has emerged whereby a political authority (principal) develops some policy and then they subcontract out to some coercive agent (i.e., member of the security apparatus) to implement it (the arrows that lead to the targets/victims).  While the idea of the repressive process is important, research has not exactly kept up.    

Accepting that the model above is where the field has gone, Below I list the 5 things that a rigorous investigation of Atrocity Endings must include: 

1) The "Kill" Order
•Plan/Preference:
•Party Manifestos
•Political Speeches
•Government Reports
•Memoirs
•Media Broadcasts

•Source: Political Communication, Cultural Studies

2) Order Diffusion
•Specific Information about Perpetrators
•Identity (name, unit, membership)
•How they receive orders
•How they are connected to political leadership
•How they implement orders

•Source: Security Studies, Criminology, Policing, Military Sociology

3) Victims/Targets
•Pre-violent status (i.e., size, location, resistance level)

•Source: Demography, Health, Public Opinion

4) Event/Campaign Engagement/Process
•Enactment of behavior of Interest (i.e., perpetrator-victim dyad by space/time)
•Range of activity, intensity at time t to t+n

•Sources: Micro-Foundational Research tradition (Ball, Davenport and Stam, Kalyvas, Strauss, Wilkinson)

5) Event/Campaign Termination
•Behavioral termination of campaign (i.e., killing stops)

•Sources: Micro-Foundational Research tradition (Ball, Davenport and Stam, Kalyvas, Strauss, Wilkinson)

The Year..:  2014 is the year of ENDKILL.  A 365 day journey into my research archive and active agenda, reflecting on what we know and do not know about mass atrocities and how to stop them (delivered once weekly so as not to burden the viewer/reader/audience).  

Three years of U.S. Action/Inaction on Darfur, 2004-2007

The following is a chronology and brief summary of U.S. government action on the issue of Darfur in Sudan.  The points below include U.S. action before the United Nations, actions taken by the U.S. Congress and the actions and words of Administration officials.  Why the listing?  Well, it is frequently said that nothing is done.  This is not completely true.  Much of what is done has little to no effect.  

2004

April

• U.S. pressed for the first UN Security Council press statement on Darfur.[1]

June

• Secretary Powell traveled to Khartoum and Darfur, Sudan.

• UN: the U.S. and U.K. introduced UN Security Council Resolution 1547.
• The resolution establishes a UN Special Representative of the Secretary General and creates a UN political office in Sudan.

• American officials warn of genocide.

• "I can tell you that we see indicators of genocide and there is evidence that points in that direction," said Pierre Prosper, the U.S. ambassador-at-large for war crimes. Prosper said the U.S. government was "actively reviewing" the possibility that genocide was taking place in the Darfur region.

July 2

• U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell returns from a visit to Sudan
• Powell told the Khartoum government that it can only expect normalization of relations with the U.S. if it makes immediate efforts to rein in the Arab militias in Darfur.  Powell met in talks with Secretary General Annan and Sudanese government officials about the situation in Darfur and the obstacles faced by humanitarian workers in distributing aid.

July 22

• Congress passed a unanimous, bipartisan, bicameral resolution declaring that the conflict in Darfur is genocide.[2]
• The resolution passed 422-0 in the House of Representatives and passed without dissent in the Senate.

July 29

• UN: the U.S. sponsored Security Council Resolution 1556, threatening sanctions against Sudan if the government does not pull back militias in Darfur.
• The U.S. later softened the wording of the resolution after some members of the U.N. Security Council expressed concerns over the word "sanctions."
• The Resolution demanded that the Government of the Sudan disarm the Janjaweed militias, apprehend and bring to justice its leaders and their associates who had incited and carried out violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, as well as other atrocities in the country’s Darfur region.

o   The Council decided that all States would take the necessary measures to prevent the sale or supply to all non-governmental entities and individuals, including the Janjaweed, operating in North, South and West Darfur by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft and related materials of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment and spare parts, whether or not originating in their territories

September

• Secretary Powell met with SPLM Chairman Garang in Washington, D.C.

• The U.S. sponsored UN Security Council Resolution 1564 on Darfur.
• The Resolution declared that, should the Sudan fail to comply fully with resolution 1556 of July 30th or to cooperate with the expansion and extension of the AU monitoring presence in Darfur, it would consider taking additional measures, including sanctions, to affect Sudan’s oil sector and the Government or its individual members. The Council also requested the Secretary-General to rapidly establish an international commission of inquiry, which would immediately investigate reports of human rights violations in Darfur, and determine whether acts of genocide had occurred there.

September 9

• Bush called violence in Darfur genocide
• “We have concluded that genocide has taken place in Darfur”[3]

• Secretary of State Colin Powell testified to genocide in Darfur
• Secretary of State Colin Powell testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that genocide is occurring in Darfur.[4]  He also stated, “no new action is dictated by this determination.”

• UN: the U.S. circulated draft resolution threatening Sudan with sanctions
• US put forward a UN draft resolution threatening Sudan with sanctions on its oil. This was adopted, in modified form, on September 13, 2004 as Resolution 1564.[5]
• (Under pressure from China, the U.S. eased its threat of oil sanctions against Sudan, revising its motion to the Security Council to say the UN "shall consider" punitive action, rather than "will take.")

November

• Secretary Powell dispatched a U.S. team to discuss security arrangements with the Sudan People’s Liberation Army Front Commanders.

• UN: under the U.S. Presidency, the UN Security Council held an extraordinary session in Nairobi, Kenya to discuss Sudan.
• The parties signed a Declaration, witnessed by the Security Council, to finish the final comprehensive agreement by the end of 2004.

• Secretary Powell met with National Democratic Alliance (NDA) Chairman Mirghani. President Bush called President Bashir and SPLM Chairman Garang.

December

• The parties completed the permanent ceasefire and implementation modalities. President Bush signed the Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act.

2005

 

FY 2005

• The U.S contributed $132 million to UNMIS.[6]

• In 2005, the U.S. provided over 60% of aid to Darfur and 50% of overall Sudan aid.

• The U.S. instituted a $16.4 million humanitarian campaign to prevent rape, treat victims, build crisis centers, and educate local populations over the last 6 months.

January

• U.S. helped broker the Comprehensive Peace Agreement
• The CPA was between North and South Sudan, ending 21 years of civil war. It was signed in January 2005.

March

• U.S. assistance of $17.85 million for Sudanese refugees in Chad
• U.S. announced contribution of $17.85 million to the UNHCR for assistance and protection of Sudanese who have sought refuge in Chad.[7]

March 2

• (did not pass) Darfur Accountability Act
• S. 495: introduced on March 2, 2005, by former Sen. Jon Corzine (D-NJ). There were 40 senators who co-sponsored the bill.
• The bill would direct the president to identify and target individuals responsible for the genocide in Darfur. The United States would freeze assets and deny visas to these individuals.
• Although the bill did not pass, it helped to set the stage for further legislation on the situation.

March 17

• (did not pass) Darfur Genocide Accountability Act
• H.R. 1424: introduced by Rep. Donald Payne (D-NJ). There were 138 co-sponsors of the bill.
• Although the bill never passed, it provided a powerful precedent for future congressional action. The Act called for targeted sanctions against Sudanese government officials, authorized the president to use force to stop the genocide, and denied port entry to ships engaged in business in the oil sector of Sudan.
• The DGAA gave way to the Darfur Peace and Accountability Act.

March 31

• U.S. abstained on Security Council Resolution 1593 (which passed) authorizing referral of the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court.
• The U.S. administration reportedly agreed to abstain after Britain brokered a late-hour compromise adding language to the resolution addressing U.S. concerns about the ICC’s jurisdiction over nonparties to its statute. 

November

• U.S. Senate passed Darfur Peace and Accountability Act (S. 1462) by unanimous consent.
• The Act restates the U.S. government’s position that the Darfur conflict constitutes genocide, asks the government to expand the African Union peacekeeping force in Darfur (AMIS) and give the force a stronger mandate, including more generous logistical support. It also directs the government to assist the International Criminal Court to bring justice to those guilty of war crimes in Darfur.

December

• U.S. Congress rejected Condolezza Rice’s request to restore $50 million in aid to the African Union that human rights groups say had been cut from the budget in November.

2006

February

• UN: U.S. offered motioni to begin plans to send UN peacekeepers to Darfur
• as the United States began its month-long presidency of the UN Security Council, it offered a motion to begin plans to send UN peacekeepers to Darfur. The Security Council agreed unanimously to begin the planning process to send the troops, with a final decision to come later. It called for a 12,000 to 20,000 troop presence in Darfur with the 7,000 African Union troops already there being given new weapons and being incorporated into the UN mission.

March 2

• Senate passed resolution recommending NATO deployment or other security force in Darfur for civilian protection
• Senate Resolution 383: ntroduced by Sen. Joseph Biden (D-DE). There were 21 co-sponsors of the resolution. S. Res. 383 passed by unanimous consent.
• The resolution urged the president to take several steps to protect civilians in Darfur. Among these recommendations is proposing to NATO that they consider deploying troops to Darfur and providing logistical support to any UN mission. The resolution also calls on the UN Security Council to approve a force in Darfur in the near future.
• Although this resolution is nonbinding, it provides a powerful sense of Congress that the president needs to do more to end the genocide. The resolution expresses that the United States should take all steps necessary to ending the conflict, including deployment of a NATO mission.

March

• UN: the U.S. led Security Council action on Resolution 1663
• Resolution 1663 seeks a speedy transition from AMIS to a larger UN peacekeeping operation as called for by the AU.

March 16

• Congress voted in favor of amendment increasing funding for AU peacekeepers by $50 million
• House Amendment 709 to H.R. 4939
• H.R. 4939 made emergency supplemental appropriations for the 2006 fiscal year. Rep. Michael Capuano (D-MA) offered an amendment to this resolution which increased funding for African Union peacekeepers by $50 million.
• Congress voted in favor of the amendment by a vote of 213 to 208.

April

• UN: US presented a draft resolution calling for sanctions imposed on four people implicated in the continuing genocide in Darfur.
• China and Russia blocked the proposal.

• UN: the U.S. led Security Council action on Resolution 1672
• The Security Council approved Resolution 1672 which applies targeted sanctions in the form of a travel ban and asset freeze on four specific individuals responsible for committing heinous crimes on the people of Darfur.

• House passed Darfur Peace and Accountability Act
• The Act restates the U.S. government’s position that the Darfur conflict constitutes genocide, asks the government to expand the African Union peacekeeping force in Darfur (AMIS) and give the force a stronger mandate, including more generous logistical support. It also directs the government to assist the International Criminal Court to bring justice to those guilty of war crimes in Darfur.

May

• U.S. Deputy Secretary of State helped orchestrate accord between SLA and government of Sudan.
• On May 5, the government of Sudan signed an accord with the Sudan Liberation Army. However, the agreement was rejected by two other, smaller groups, the Justice and Equality Movement and a rival faction of the SLA.  The accord was orchestrated by the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Robert B. Zoellick, Salim Ahmed Salim (working on behalf of the African Union), AU representatives, and other foreign officials operating in Abuja, Nigeria. The accord calls for the disarmament of the Janjaweed militia, and for the rebel forces to disband and be incorporated into the army. But the agreement, signed in Abuja, was rejected by a smaller SLM faction and the rebel Justice and Equality Movement.

June 8

•  (Congress votes against) House amendment to increase humanitarian aid to Darfur by $50 million
• Amendment 980 to H.R. 5522
• H.R. 5522 made appropriations for foreign operations, export financing, and related programs for the 2007 fiscal year. Reps. Tom Lantos (D-CA), David Obey (D-WI) and former Rep. Henry Hyde (R-IL) offered an amendment to increase humanitarian aid to Darfur by $50 million.
• Congress voted against the amendment on June 8, 2006, by a vote of 198 to 225. (As the genocide continues in Darfur, the humanitarian situation worsens. In April 2006, aid organizations were forced to drastically cut food rations to refugees in the region).

July

• U.S. committed $116 million to AMIS at Sudan donors’ conference in Brussels
• Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Jendayi Frazer announced a U.S. commitment of $116 million to the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) at the Sudan donors’ conference in Brussels on July 18.

• U.S. said it won’t fund AU peacekeeping force past September 2006
• At a UN donor conference in Brussels, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Jendayi Frazer stated that the United States would not fund the AU peacekeeping force past September 2006.

August

• U.S. Envoy Bolton pressed UN Security Council for resolution to authorize and set deployment date for peacekeeping operation
• After a closed-door Security Council meeting on Darfur August 28, Bolton said that the United States has exerted considerable diplomatic effort to accommodate the concerns of Sudan and some members of the Security Council, but "there comes a time ultimately when you have to stand up and vote."[8]

• U.S. and Britain introduced Security Council resolution to send U.N. peacekeepers to Darfur.
• Sudan's ruling party rejected the draft resolution a week later.

September 13

• Senate unanimously passed resolution urging Bush to call on UN to deploy peacekeeping troops to Darfur and for NATO to enforce no-fly zone.
• Senate Resolution 559: introduced by Sen. Joseph Biden (D-DE). Thirty-seven senators co-sponsored the resolution, which passed by unanimous consent.
•  The resolution called on the president and the United Nations to take immediate steps to end the genocide in Darfur. Specifically, the resolution calls on the UN to deploy peacekeeping troops to the region as soon as possible. It also urges the president to work with NATO and the UN to enforce a no-fly zone in Darfur.
• While the resolution is nonbinding, it recommends several important measures that President Bush should enforce to protect civilians in Darfur.

September 26

• House passed resolution urging Bush to appoint Special Envoy
• H.R. 992: introduced by Rep. Frank Wolf (R-VA). There were 108 co-sponsors of the bill. The bill passed on Sept. 26, 2006, by a 414 to 3 vote.
• The resolution urged the president to appoint a Presidential Special Envoy to Sudan. Shortly after the resolution passed, President Bush appointed former USAID Administrator Andrew Natsios as the Special Envoy to Sudan. This position ensures that the genocide remains a high priority for the administration.

• House passed resolution calling for UN peacekeeping force in Darfur
• HR 723: introduced by Rep. Tom Lantos (D-CA) and passed by a 412 to 7 vote.
• The resolution called on the UN to provide a robust peacekeeping mission in Darfur as soon as possible. H. Res. 723 urged the President to help deploy a NATO bridging force to protect civilians until a UN force can be fully deployed

October 13

• Bush signed Darfur Peace and Accountability Act into law
• S. 1462: the Darfur Peace and Accountability Act (DPAA) was introduced on July 21, 2005, by Sen. Sam Brownback (R-KS). There were 38 senators who co-sponsored the bill. The Senate passed the DPAA by unanimous consent. A conference committee later revised the bill and removed Section 11, which would have protected states that divested from the worst-offending companies conducting business in Sudan.
•  This revised bill was passed in the Senate on Sept. 21, 2006 by unanimous consent. The DPAA was signed into law on Oct. 13, 2006.
• The bill imposes sanctions against officials the president identifies as responsible for the genocide and urges the President to deny US port entry to any ships engaged in business in Sudan’s oil sector.

• Bush issued Executive Order 13412[9] strengthening some sanctions on the government of Sudan
• “Pursuant to IEEPA and the NEA, I determined that the Government of Sudan continues to implement policies and actions that violate human rights, in particular with respect to the conflict in Darfur, where the Government of Sudan exercises administrative and legal authority and pervasive practical influence, and that the Government of Sudan has a pervasive role in the petroleum and petrochemical industries in Sudan. In light of these determinations, and in order to reconcile sections 7 and 8 of the DPAA, I issued this order to continue the country wide blocking of the Government of Sudan's property and to prohibit transactions relating to the petroleum and petrochemical industries in Sudan”

2007

Generally

• U.S. is funding of 25% of the cost of the hybrid UN-AU Darfur peacekeeping operation.

• U.S. has been responsible for the construction and maintenance of 34 Darfur base camps for the over 7,000 AU peacekeepers.

• U.S. has provided 40,000 metric tons of food aid monthly, as the largest food donor.

• Since the conflict began, the U.S. has provided more than $1.7 billion in humanitarian and peacekeeping assistance for Darfur. The U.S. is the world's largest single donor to the people of Darfur. [10]

 

FY ‘07

• $4 billion in aid since 2005
• U.S. has provided over $4 billion in humanitarian, peacekeeping, and development assistance to Sudan and Eastern Chad since 2005.

March 8

• Sudan Divestment Authorization Act
• S.831: Introduced by Sen. Richard Durbin (D-IL) and has been referred to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs.
• The bill supports state and local efforts to divest from companies that do business with the Khartoum government. The underlying objective is to make clear that Congress did not intend to foreclose or preempt state and local Sudan divestment efforts and that such local efforts are not incompatible with federal sanctions law.

March 15

• Genocide Accountability Act passed by unanimous Senate consent
• S.888: Introduced by Sen. Richard Durbin (D-IL). The bill had five co-sponsors, Senators Coburn, Cornyn, Feingold, Kennedy and Leahy. The bill was passed by the Senate by unanimous consent on March 29, 2007.
• The bill seeks to close a legal loophole that prevents the U.S. Justice Department from prosecuting people in the United States who have committed genocide in other countries.

April

• U.S. and Britain threaten Sudan with sanctions and other punitive measures
• …unless it agrees to accept a robust U.N. peacekeeping force.

• Bush gave speech at Holocaust Memorial Museum criticizing Sudanese government and threatening sanctions
• Bush stated that "The time for promises is over — President Bashir must act." According to Bush, failure to do so would result in sanctions barring all dollar transactions between the United States and Sudan and block interaction with 29 Sudanese businesses.

May 16

• Senate unanimously passed resolution calling on China to influence Sudan
• Senate Resolution 203: introduced by Sen. Robert Menendez (D-NJ). The bill had 27 co-sponsors and passed by the Senate by unanimous consent on July 30, 2007.
• The bill calls on the Government of the People's Republic of China to use its unique influence and economic leverage to stop genocide and violence in Darfur, Sudan.

May 29

• Bush announced further economic and diplomatic sanctions against Sudan over the Darfur situation.
• The measures list 31 companies that are doing business with Sudan, in some cases supplying arms. It is now illegal for any U.S. citizen or company to do business with these 31 enterprises. The U.S. is almost going it alone at this point. China and other Security Council members criticize the sanctions and even Britain, while toying with the idea, does not go along.

July 31

• Senate unanimously passed bill calling for deployment of UN/AU hybrid force in Darfur
• Senate Resolution 276: introduced by Sen. Joseph Biden (D-DE). The bill had 39 co-sponsors and was passed by the Senate by unanimous consent on July 31, 2007.
• The bill calls for the swift deployment of the United Nations-African Union hybrid peacekeeping force in Darfur and for efforts to renew the peace process.

• Darfur Accountability and Divestment Act:
• H.R.180: introduced by Rep. Barbara Lee (D-CA). There were 151 co-sponsors of the bill. The bill passed by a 418 to 1 vote.
• The bill creates a list of problematic companies, authorizes states and local governments to divest, prohibits U.S. government contracts with companies fueling
• the genocide, and authorizes states to also prohibit contracts.

August

• U.S. helped lead negotiations which led to UN authorization for 26,000 peacekeeping troops for Darfur[11]
• The Security Council vote ended months of negotiations led by Britain, France and the United States and involving China, Russia, and Sudan.
• The Bush administration welcomed the council's decision to adopt the resolution, but it declined to co-sponsor the resolution on the grounds that it was not tough enough
• Secretary of State Condolezza Rice phoned Ban Ki-moon to press him to take over the mission by October. Ban refused on the grounds that his military planners would not be ready.

September 25

• Bush participated in UN Security Council Meeting on Africa
• Bush made a statement to the Security Council urging focus on Darfur and supporting the troops’ mission.[12]

[1] http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/40459.htm    


[2] S. Con. Res. 133 


[3] http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/09/print/20040909-10.html 


[4] http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-english&y=2004&m=September&x=20040909115958JTgnilwoD0.5094873.    


[5] http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/515/47/PDF/N0451547.pdf?OpenElement 


[6] http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/60373.htm 


[7] http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/43534.htm 


[8] http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-english&y=2006&m=August&x=20060828171244eaifas0.3511469 


[9] http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/10/20061013-14.html 


[10] http://www.state.gov/p/af/rls/85600.htm


[11] http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/31/AR2007073101731.html 


[12] http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/09/20070925-8.html 


 

The Year..:  2014 is the year of ENDKILL.  A 365 day journey into my research archive and active agenda, reflecting on what we know and do not know about mass atrocities and how to stop them (delivered once weekly so as not to burden the viewer/reader/audience).  

Convinced that there was something of merit within existing databases concerned with large-scale state atrocity, I decided to try and evaluate what the different sources identified as the relevant cases.  For this, I paired up with Ragnhild Nordas, beginning an effort we called "Bloodbath & Beyond".

The idea here was that there could really be no rigorous analysis of the topic if there was no list.  This is afterall how the Correlates of War, UCDP, Nicholas Sambanis and James Fearon/David Laitin's projects got started.

Perusing journals we settled on 8 different sources that had been employed: Rudy Rummel, The Political Terror Scale (at 3 or above), the Political Instability Task Force - Genocide/Politicide listing, Jennifer Balint, Ben Valentino/Paul Huth, the UCDP One-sided violence data, Genocide Watch's list as well as some research by William Easterly.  We identified all cases within each database and then attempted to figure out if the same cases were covered.  The basic logic here was straightforward: if the different sources were covering the same topic in some manner, then there should be some overlap.  If the sources were not covering the same topic, then there should be very little overlap.  This is in the general direction of a cross-validation exercise.

Note: below we generally mention the cases where the perpetrator as well as victim were identified.  If there are multiple years lists with a / this is because the date is contested across the source material provided.  

What did we find? Well, before you look write down on a piece of paper what mass state-oriented killings existed between 1900-2010.

Essentially, we found that most cases only had one source associated with them (total 650 out of 897).  A great many of these could be attributed to the fact that before 1950 there are only 5 sources out of all sources that were around but this is still a decent amount.

Numerous cases had two sources, providing some degree of corroboration (171 out of 897): the Canudus massacre in Brazil 1886-1897, the colonial massacres of the Herrero in South Africa 1900-1918, the Red and White terrors in Hungary 1919, the Transylvania conflict between 1919 and a variety of dates, the massacre of Jewish Refugees in Jordan 1920-1921/1929/1946, Turkey 1924-1927 against the Kurds, Germany from 1933-1945 against the Jews, Poles, Disabled, homosexuals, communists and Jehovah's Witnesses, the Dominican Republic against Dominco-Haitians in 1937, Former USSR against Meskhetians and Crimea Tartars from 1944-1968 as well as against Estonians in 1949, the Cultural Revolution in China from 1966-1975, Cambodia from 1968-1975, El Salvador 1979-1991, Nicaragua against the Miskito from 1981-1992, Yugoslavia against muslims as well as Croats between 1991-1995 and Thailand in 2003.  

Fewer cases had three sources (38 out of 897). Croatia agains the Serbs, Jews, Gypsies between 1941-1945, Burma 1948-1962/87, Israel against the Palestinians between 1948-1955/1956/1967/1973, Sudan against Southern nationalists 1952-1972, Guinea-Bissau 1958-1984, Iraq against the Kurds 1961-1975, Rwanda against Tutsi ruling class 1962-1964 as well as 1990-1994, Nigeria between 1967-1970, India against the Naxalites 1968-1982, Cambodia 1970-1975, Philippines 1972-1976, Chile against Leftists 1976-1983, El Salvador against Leftists 1980-1989, Uganda 1980-1986, Iran against Kurds 1981-1992, India against the Sikhs 1984, Burundi 1988, Indonesia against the Auyu 1989-1992, Croatia 1993-1995 against Muslims/Serbs and Sudan 2003-present.  

Even fewer cases had four sources (24 out of 897): China against the Kuomintang between 1949-1956, Indonesia against the communist/chinese between 1965-1967, Uganda against the Karamojong, Acholi, Lango, Catholic clergy and political opposition between 1971-1979, Ethiopia between 1974-1991, Indonesia 1975-1992, Argentina 1976-1980, Cambodia 1979, Iran against the bahai 1979-1984, Somalia 1988-1991, Kenya 1991-1994 and Rwanda 1994.

A handful had five (9 out of 897): Colombia 1948-1962, Angola/Portugal 1961-1962, Nigeria against the Igbo 1966-1970, Pakistan against Bengali nationalists 1971, Chile 1973-1976, Angola 1975-1994, Cambodia 1975-1979, Syria 1981-1982, Sudan 1983-1999/2002, 

Three cases had six sources.  None had more than this.  Burundi 1972-1973, Afghanistan 1978-1992 and Bosnia 1992-1995.

So, what did/do we take away from this?  Well, several things:

1) it is useful to create a list so that we can begin to discuss the cases as a community (please send me emails regarding your opinions about what should/should not be there as well as any sources you have regarding perpetrators, victims, onsets and terminations).  This is something that I assumed the Political Instability Task Force or the Atrocity Prevention Board would do but whatever.  Why wait for them.  Let's get started.

2) The list provides a nice starting point. We have begun evaluating the cases (one at a time) to find whatever source material exists on who did what to whom as well as how confident we are about this information.  Whatever one's opinion about Rudy Rummel's work in the Statistics of Democide, he did provide source material and one could (as we are beginning to do) go back and start to evaluate its quality. 

3) 897 isn't a large number (compared to something like GDELT for example) but it ain't small either - especially with each case shrouded in violence, fear, smoke and often ev.  If you want to help, let us know.

4) What do six sources converging actually mean?  Dangzer back in the 1970s discovered that newspapers were likely to cover riots if there was a specific news organization present.  We need to differentiate between our sources, getting down to where they got their information from to first gauge independence and then to gauge why the information was covered/provided.  We are now trying to ascertain how each of the sources collected information and coded it.  Not an easy task.  Some are clearer than others.  

5) The list does not completely fit our expectations regarding what we thought would be covered by the most sources but we were not off by that much.  For example, there were no cases with three or more cases that we never heard of.  

Note: For good overview of the field see Daniel Solomon's great review.

I've been studying state repression/human rights violation for approximately 2 decades now and realized a few years ago that the field has mostly been concerned with understanding why different tactics are used (e.g., torture, negative sanctions, arrests and targeted assassination) as well as how bad things can get (e.g., how many people are killed). What has received much less attention is what stops state repressive action - seeing no tactics and no politically-related deaths at all after some has occurred. We have plenty on what reduces severity (e.g., political democracy, reduced political conflict/dissent/behavioral challenge, naming/shaming) and even some attention to some of the factors that we think might be related to termination such as intervention and sanctions (Kathman and Wood, Krain as well as more recently Hultman et al.), but there is very little on what terminates state-sponsored, mass killing (which I will maintain along with others is still the worst of the worst in terms of how people are killed - nobody kills quite like governments in terms of volume). 

So, with this awareness, about five years ago I started working on the topic. This happened quite by accident.  In @, I won an award to be a Visiting Scholar at the Russell Sage Foundation and the project that I intended on engaging in concerning contention in America fell apart as some of the people working with me at the time had to withdraw. In this space, I then asked an interesting question: what was worth researching?  After a few weeks (looking through old notes, reading a few books that I had put off and walking through Central Park), I came up with stopping mass violence.  What could be done to stop state-sponsored mass killing after it was underway? This was one of the big concerns after the Holocaust and the "Never Again" campaign.  

Topic in hand, I then set out to read what had been written and quickly realized that despite a wealth of historical material on individual cases, we were not really clear on what worked in large part because the question had not been asked or examined explicitly.  Indeed, at that time mostly every one that studied the termination of conflict and violence was focused on civil war as if that was the only game in town.  I had been aided in my thinking by a new project by Alex DeWaal at the SSRC on "How Genocides End".  This webpage presented some insights into what might be involved but they did not engage in any rigorous assessments of what worked.  They did call for some attention to this topic.  Shortly after this I found work by Erik Melander on preventing mass killings before they get started and drawing upon some earlier collaborative work then Courtenay Conrad and Will Moore, came out with a piece on ending torture.

What did I do?  Well, initially I tried to find out what data existed.  There were a few databases around: e.g., Rudy Rummel's list of "democides" (i.e., genocides and politicides) put together.  I had never seen anyone use the source however until Easterly and it was not quite clear how the source material was used to put together the database.  There was Barbara Harff and Ted Gurr's list of genocides and politicides which got taken over by the State Failure /Political Instability Task Force (SF/PITF). While this had been used by more scholars than Rummel's data, I again had some questions. For example, it was not clear what source material was used (differing from Rummel's extensive listing) to build the database. Questions aside, I decided to use the Harff/Gurr/SF/PITF data. 

I began with what I thought was a simple exercise but one that took more time than I wanted. After hiring a student, finding a source to code all information from (Keesings Contemporary Archive) which was available for all countries from 1950 to the present), working out the coding protocol, coding the material and then recoding when we did not believe the results, we attempted to ascertain how each of the cases in the identified Harff/Gurr/SF/PITF data ended.  

Thinking about the subject of termination was pretty interesting because it is clear that these events could end in a wide variety of ways:

The codes:
1) the relevant government (the perpetrators) succeeds in killing off all those targeted
2) the government succeeds in killing off enough of those targeted
3) those targeted leave, eliminating the capacity of the government to continue
4) those targeted receive some type of cover/protection, eliminating the capacity of the government to continue
5) the government cannot continue because of a change in will, resources and/or both
6) the government is blocked by intervention and cannot continue
7) the government changes its strategy of engagement with the targeted community away from violence to something else
8) the government stops because of increased scrutiny/criticism
9) the government stops because of threatened/imposed sanctions
10) The government is forced out of power

The variation is important because discussions of interventions really compel us to think about #6, 8 and 9 but the others are just as possible.  Several of them are pretty grim such as #1 and 2 whereas others are kind of sneaky such as #7. It is crucial to differentiate between the strategies however because if we only examine one without considering the others, then we could improperly understand what is taking place.  The results from this analysis are provided below.

What do I find?  Well, according to our coding of Keesings, most genocides and politicides end because governments are forced out of power (e.g., South Vietnam, Uganda, Somalia, Rwanda, Equatorial Guinea, Congo, Cambodia and Afghanistan) or the government changed tactics (e.g., Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Guatemala, Iraq, Nigeria, the Philippines and Sudan).  Governments were deemed blocked in Yugoslavia, Bosnia, Angola and Pakistan, stopped by criticism in Chile, El Salvador and Indonesia as well as hindered because of threatened/imposed sanctions in Angola. Some of the cases could not be coded at all as there was nothing in Keesings concerning why termination occurred: Myanmar and three instances in Burundi. In other words, according to this source, there are a number of different ways that genocide and politicide end and only some of them concern things that are done by the international community.

So, I looked at these results and then looked some more. I never quite figured out what to do with these results.  I ended more confused about the topic than at the beginning.  It was useful to begin my analyses here though.  At least that is my conclusion now.  I was happy to begin my inquiry into ending state sponsored political violence. This is especially the case when I keep seeing publication after publication coming out on other, somewhat lesser forms of violent action.    

As Camus once commented "All I ask is that, in the middle of a murderous world, we agree to reflect on murder and to make a choice" 

We this last statement in mind, I announce that this is the first installation of a project i am now calling ENDKILL.  Each week I will be moving forward my discussion of how to end state sponsored mass killing.  Let's see where a year of sustained effort can take us.

I often wonder about whether the new technologies that we have available to us improve anything or if we just keep creating things to create them.  Here are some examples: one, two and three.

In case you missed it (from irish history podcast): 

"The Belfast Project at Boston College has collected an enormous archive of material on Northern Ireland over the past 40 years. Its most controversial project is a research programme that has seen people directly involved in the troubles give recorded testimonies of their experiences.

The interviewees are primarily from a republican background but also includes some loyalists. The recordings were carried out by former IRA volunteer and prisoner Anthony McIntyre in conjunction with the journalist and author Ed Moloney. Those interviewed participated on the basis that the tapes would be stored in the archives of Boston College and published only after their deaths.

This caveat of publishing posthumously was the basis of the project as the interviews were for the main about illegal activities. The first glimpse of the historical significance of these recordings was evident in the release of “Voices From the Grave” a published account of loyalist David Irvine and republican Brendan Hughes’ testimonies. These were first hand accounts not only of activities but also the motivations of two key figures in their respective movements. While at times they make very unpleasant reading, from a historical point of view these testimonies are a great insight into why people got involved in paramilitaries and how the troubles not only began but evolved. This project has the possibility to bring our understanding of the troubles to a new level given these direct testimonies of those involved."

So?  Isn't this just great?  Well, no.  The British government wants the documents as well as tape recordings and they collaborated with the US Department of Justice as well as US Federal Appeals Court to get them.  The implications?  Well, if you do research on any topic, which is in part gathered with a promise of privacy, anonymity and care, at some later date that deal might be off.  More implications (click more)!

What's a scholar of contentious politics to do?

In 2004, I published a piece with David Armstrong in the American Journal of Political Science which showed that the best way to model as well as understand the impact of democracy on repression is that of a threshold effect.  Essentially, there is no impact of democracy on repression until the highest levels have been reached.  Unlike all other studies (which did not allow for alternative specifications of the functional form), we allowed for alternatives and found this relationship to be the best.  Consequently, we could have found a linear effect or any type of non-linear impact but we did not.  Pretty good stuff.  Or, so I thought.

Despite our decent work, individuals still use a democracy and democracy squared in their models for repression under the now mistaken belief (myth?) that the relationship is what is referred as an "inverted u".  Here, it is argued that repression is low in full autocracies and full democracies but that there is "more murder in the middle."  Catchy phrase but inaccurate.  

This raised an interesting question: How does one change a habit in the social sciences?  I was of the now mistaken belief that it was most important to pursue the best and most accurate answer.   My most cynical side also believed that it was important to do this in one of the most important journals in political science.  This does not appear to be the case.  What is also important is to establish new habits as well.  

Where do cannons come from?  Kuhn is turning in his grave.

It appears as if the study of state repression is significantly divided between IR and comparative.  The former highlights factors relevant to IR: treaties, trade, international law and so on.  The former highlights factors that are relevant to comparative politics: domestic conflict, democracy, economic development and the like.  To each is own.  

The division would be acceptable but only if the insights provided by the other were included.  For example, if research identifies that a specific functional form of a relationship is an "s" shape, then unless someone comes along to show that the relationships is actually a z shape, then all models should use the s.  But people keep using a v shape!  Poor specification does have implications, no?

Of course, if scholars interested in only one type of explanation (i.e., IR or comparative) do not use the best models, then 1) their work is wrong and/or 2) the peer review system is dysfunctional for allowing such work to be published.  The problem seems to be that the two different areas largely publish in different journals and when they do publish in the same journals editors tend to select reviewers that are familiar with one strand or the other.  To each their own.

The end result: we end up with a poor understanding of the topic.  

Solution: ask what the best model is, what is the state of the art operationalization for a specific variable and then use it.  

Can't we all just google it?  Googletruth - coming soon...